Disability compensation and responsibility by Cappelen, Alexander W. et al.
Discussion paper
SAM 24   2008
ISSN:  0804-6824
DECEMBER 2008
INSTITUTT  FOR  SAMFUNNSØKONOMI
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Disability compensation and 
responsibility
BY
ALEXANDER W. CAPPELEN, OLE FRITHJOF NORHEIM,
AND BERTIL TUNGODDEN




Disability compensation and responsibility 
 
 
Alexander W. Cappelen 
Centre for Ethics 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
 
 
Ole Frithjof Norheim 
Division for Medical Ethics and the Philosophy of Science 
Department of Public Health and Primary Care 




Department of Economics 







Abstract: It is a central political goal to secure disabled individuals the same opportunities as 
others to pursue their conception of a good life. This goal reflects an ambition to combine an 
egalitarian and a liberal moral intuition. In this paper we analyze how disabled individuals 
who take part in economic activity should be compensated in order to respect these two 
intuitions. The paper asks how a system of disability compensation should be structured and 
what the level of such compensation should be. It also analyzes how the answer to these 
questions depends on whether or not the disabled individuals are held responsible for their 
choice of work effort.  
 




To extend theories of justice to cover disabled individuals is a challenge that may require a 
reshaping of the existing theories (Nussbaum 2006). In order to take account of disabled 
individuals, a theory of justice needs to address the question of how individuals who do not 
have essential physical or intellectual abilities should be treated. This question has often been 
ignored, and many authors have followed Rawls (1971, 1993) in his assumption that ”while 
citizens do not have equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, 
the moral, intellectual and physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life” (1993, p. 183, our emphasis). We want to move 
beyond the Rawlsian approach and discuss how income should be distributed in a context 
where some individuals are disabled in the sense that they have physical or mental 
impairments that have a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities. These effects might be a direct result of the impairment or a 
result of discrimination that reduces the work opportunities of disabled individuals. It is a 
central political goal to secure disabled individuals the same opportunities as non-disabled to 
pursue their conception of a good life, and therefore our focus is on how an egalitarian and a 
liberal moral intuition can be combined in the design of a fair compensation system for 
disabled individuals.1  
 
How liberal considerations of personal responsibility should be incorporated into egalitarian 
reasoning has been a central theme of modern theories of distributive justice (Dworkin 
(1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998), Kolm (1996), and 
Fleurbaey (1995, 2007). A common feature of liberal egalitarian or equal opportunity theories 
of justice is that they draw a distinction between factors individuals should be held 
responsible for, responsibility factors, and factors individuals should not be held responsible 
for, non-responsibility factors.2 For a given cut between these factors, liberal egalitarian 
theory can be seen to incorporate an egalitarian and a liberal intuition. The egalitarian 
                                                 
1 By this we do not intend to argue that income compensation is the only relevant way of addressing unjust 
disadvantages of disabled individuals. See Wolff (2008) for a discussion of alternative strategies in the design of 
just disability policies.  
2 A central issue in liberal egalitarian theory is where the cut between responsibility and non-responsibility 
factors should be drawn. One common way of drawing the responsibility cut, which we shall appeal to in this 
paper, is to define responsibility factors as factors within individual control and non-responsibility factors as 




intuition is that individuals should not be held responsible for non-responsibility factors and, 
therefore, inequalities due to factors for which the agent is not responsible are unjust and 
should be eliminated. The liberal intuition is that individuals should be held responsible for 
responsibility factors and, therefore, inequalities due to factors for which the agent is 
responsible are just and should be preserved.  
 
We analyze how disabled individuals who take part in economic activity should be 
compensated in order to respect these two intuitions. In the analysis we distinguish between 
two possible effects of physical and intellectual disabilities in the design of disability 
compensation. First, disabilities might reduce the disabled individual’s productivity. Second, 
disabilities might imply that a disabled individual cannot be held responsible for his choices. 
In this paper we study how these two possible effects of disability affect how a fair system of 
disability compensation should be structured and what the level of such compensation should 
be. The paper is primarily concerned with ideal theory and the main results of the paper are 
derived within a simplified framework where we assume that the government has full 
information. In the last section, however, we discuss the value of ideal theory and how our 
results can be extended.  
 
Our main result with respect to the structure of the disability compensation is that such 
compensation must be conditional on the choice of work effort made by the disabled 
individuals. Surprisingly, this is the case even in situations where the disabled individuals are 
not held responsible for their choices. In such situations, however, the compensation should 
be decreasing rather than increasing in the choice of work effort. Our main result with respect 
to the level of the disability compensation is that the compensation should ensure that the 
disabled individuals, on average, earn the same as non-disabled individuals. This conclusion 
is also independent of whether we hold disabled individuals responsible for their choice of 
work effort or not. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we defend two principles that capture 
the egalitarian and the liberal intuition in a context with disabled individuals. In section 3 we 
analyze the implications of these principles for the design of disability compensation under 
the assumption that we want to hold disabled individuals responsible for their choices. This 
assumption is in some cases unreasonable, and in section 4 we discuss how we should 
compensate disabled individuals if we do not want to hold them responsible for their choices. 
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The results of the paper are derived within a simplified framework where all disabled 
individuals are assumed to have the same productivity and to be responsible for the same 
factors. The final section concludes with a discussion of the implications our results in 
situations where disabled individuals differ with respect to both these dimensions and when 




2. Two moral principles 
 
There is a large literature on what restrictions the egalitarian intuition and the liberal intuition 
impose on a fair income distribution.3 In this literature, however, there has been no explicit 
focus on the possibility that we might not want to hold individuals responsible for the same 
set of factors. In this paper we introduce an egalitarian principle and a liberal principle that 
take account of this possibility and allow for individual-specific responsibility sets. 
Throughout the paper we assume that disability compensation satisfies a minimal requirement 
of anonymity (or impartiality) saying that individuals who are identical in all respects should 
have the same post-tax income, that is, the identity of individuals should play no role in a fair 
system of disability compensation. 
 
The egalitarian intuition is that any inequality between individuals must be justified by 
appealing to differences in some responsibility factors. This intuition implies that individuals 
who are identical with respect to all responsibility factors should have the same outcome. The 
following principle of equalization therefore captures a core element of the egalitarian 
intuition. 
 
The principle of equalization: If two individuals are responsible for the same set of factors 
and they are identical with respect to these factors, then they should have the same post-tax 
income. 
 
This is a generalization of the classical egalitarian principle in the social choice literature, 
which presupposes that people are held responsible for the same set of factors (see Fleurbaey, 
2007). The principle of equalization is consistent with an income distribution where disabled 
                                                 
3 See Fleurbaey (2007) for a careful overview of this literature, including both the philosophical and the social 
choice literature. 
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individuals working the same number of hours as non-disabled individuals receive a lower 
post-tax income, if the non-disabled individuals but not the disabled individuals are held 
responsible for working hours. So the principle of equalization does not necessarily require 
redistribution between non-disabled individuals and disabled individuals.   
 
To illustrate the principle, consider a situation where a person’s pre-tax income is determined 
by how many hours he works and by his productivity and where two individuals are held 
responsible for how many hours they work, but not for their productivity.  The principle of 
equalization then implies that if the two individuals work the same number of hours, then it is 
fair that they receive the same income even if they do not have the same productivity and 
therefore have different pre-tax incomes. The principle does not, however, place any 
restrictions on the distribution of income between individuals who work different number of 
hours or individuals who have different responsibility sets. The principle is for example 
consistent with an income distribution where those who work most hours receive all the 
income. It is therefore much weaker than the strict egalitarian principle that income always 
should be equalized between all individuals.  
 
The liberal intuition is that redistribution only can be justified by appealing to differences in 
non-responsibility factors. The implication of this intuition is straightforward in situations 
where all individuals are identical with respect to their non-responsibility factors. In such 
situations all income inequalities are a result of differences in responsibility factors and 
accordingly there should be no redistribution. We can formulate this as the minimal principle 
of responsibility. 
 
The minimal principle of responsibility: If all individuals are responsible for the same set 
of factors and they are identical with respect to all non-responsibility factors, then there 
should be no redistribution. 
 
This is a reformulation of the classical minimal responsibility principle in the social choice 
literature, where it is presupposed that people are held responsible for the same set of factors 
(see Fleurbaey, 2007). 
 
This principle can be illustrated by considering a situation where all individuals are 
responsible for how many hours they work, but not for their productivity and where everyone 
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has the same productivity. In this situation all income inequalities would be due to differences 
in choices and there should be no redistribution. 
 
We are, however, concerned with the fact that disabled individuals differ from non-disabled 
individuals with respect to their non-responsibility factors. In such situations the minimal 
principle of responsibility is of little use. We therefore propose a principle that captures the 
liberal intuition even in situations where individuals are different with respect to non-
responsibility factors.  
 
To formulate this principle we need to introduce the notion of a responsibility-group.  
 
A responsibility-group: In any given situation, a responsibility-group is a group of 
individuals who are (a) held responsible for the same factors, and (b) are identical with 
respect to their responsibility factors.  
 
As an example, all individuals working the same number of hours constitute a responsibility-
group if working hours is the only responsibility factor. Note that such responsibility-groups 
may differ with respect to non-responsibility factors. To illustrate, suppose that disabled 
individuals have lower productivity than non-disabled individuals and work four hours every 
day, whereas non-disabled individuals work eight hours every day. In such a situation, we 
have two responsibility-groups; the individuals working eight hours and the individuals 
working four hours, but these two groups differ substantially with respect to non-
responsibility factors. 
 
In the formulation of the liberal intuition, however, we want to appeal to a situation where all 
responsibility-groups are representative. 
 
A representative responsibility-group: A responsibility-group is representative if the 
distribution of non-responsibility factors among the members of the group is the same as the 
distribution of the non-responsibility factors in society at large.  
 
In the example above, we do not have representative responsibility-groups, since the 
distribution of productivity of those working four hours is different from the distribution of 
productivity of those working eight hours. But suppose now that half of the non-disabled 
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individuals and half of the disabled individuals work eight hours and the rest work four hours 
every day, i.e. that the relative frequency of hours worked is the same in both groups. In such 
a situation, we would have two representative groups in society; the group of individuals 
working four hours and the group of individuals working eight hours. 
 
In a situation where all responsibility-groups are representative, it is not possible to appeal to 
differences in non-responsibility factors to justify a net transfer from the members of one 
responsibility-group to the members of the other responsibility-group. We therefore argue that 
it follows from the liberal intuition that there should be, for short, no redistribution between 
responsibility-groups unless these groups differ with respect to the distribution of non-
responsibility factors. We can formulate the principle of responsibility as follows. 
 
The principle of responsibility: If all responsibility-groups in society are representative, 
then there should be no redistribution between the responsibility-groups.4 
 
It follows straightforwardly that this principle implies the minimal principle of responsibility 
given anonymity.5 More importantly, the principle of responsibility also restricts 
redistribution when individuals differ with respect to non-responsibility factors. To illustrate, 
consider again the situation where half of the non-disabled individuals and half of the disabled 
individuals work eight hours and the rest work four hours. In this situation, if we hold 
individuals responsible for working hours, then the principle of responsibility requires that 
there should be no net transfer of income between the group of individuals who work eight 
hours and the group of individuals who work four hours.   
 
In the rest of this paper we shall discuss implications of the principle of equalization and the 
principle of responsibility for the design of a disability compensation system. In this 
discussion, we assume that no individual is responsible for their disabilities, and thus we 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that this principle is much weaker than the requirement that each individual should be held 
accountable for the actual consequences of their responsibility factors. It has been shown that the principle of 
equalization is incompatible with this strong interpretation liberal intution when the consequences of 
responsibility factors depend on non-responsibility factors (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996). 
5 To see the relationship between the minimal principle of responsibility and the principle of responsibility, 
consider a situation where all individuals are responsible for the same set of factors and identical with respect to 
all non-responsibility factors. In this case, all responsibility-groups are representative. Hence, the principle of 
responsibility implies that there should be no redistribution between responsibility-groups. Moreover, within 
each responsibility-group, all members are identical in all respects, and thus a minimal requirement of anonymity 
requires that there should be no redistribution within responsibility-groups. In sum, there should be no 
redistribution, which is in line with the minimal principle of responsibility. 
 8
ignore the possibility that society might want to hold individuals responsible for their 




3. Responsibility and disability compensation  
 
How should disabled individuals be compensated when their disability reduces their 
productivity, if we still hold them (and the non-disabled individuals) responsible for their 
choice of hours worked? We study this question within a simple economy, where society only 
consists of two groups, the non-disabled and the disabled. Moreover, we assume that each 
individual’s pre-tax income is determined by the number of hours worked and his hourly 
productivity, and that each person’s average hourly productivity is constant and equal to his 
hourly pre-tax wage. All the non-disabled individuals is assumed to have the same 
productivity and all the disabled individuals have the same, lower, productivity, but this 
assumption is not essential for our results. We leave aside issues of risk-taking, by assuming 
that there is no uncertainty about the outcomes of individual choices. Finally, we assume that 
distribution of hours worked is the same among the non-disabled individuals and the disabled 
individuals, and that the choice of working hours is unaffected by the way in which we 
redistribute income. These assumptions greatly simplify the analysis, and we believe it 
provides a useful benchmark for the study of fair disability compensation.  
 
3.1. Unconditional disability compensation 
 
A common system of disability compensation is to give the same income compensation to all 
individuals with the same disability, that is, to let the compensation each disabled individual 
receives be determined solely on the basis of information about his disability and be 
independent of his or her choices. We shall refer to such a compensation system as 
unconditional disability compensation. How should fair unconditional disability 
compensation be designed within a liberal egalitarian framework? We first note that the 
principle of equalization has very strong implications for how we answer this question.  
 
Result 1: If all individuals are responsible for their choice of hours worked, but not for their 
productivity, then the only system of unconditional disability compensation that satisfies the 
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principle of equalization is one where (a) disability compensation is financed by taxing the 
income of the non-disabled individuals so that their hourly post-tax wage is equal to the 
hourly pre-tax wage of the disabled individuals, and (b) the tax revenues are divided equally 
among all individuals in society.6    
 
To see the intuition behind this result, note that, by definition, any system of unconditional 
compensation preserves the absolute level of pre-tax income inequality among the disabled 
individuals. The principle of equalization does not, however, justify any differences in post-
tax income between non-disabled individuals and disabled individuals working the same 
number of hours as long as they are all held responsible for working hours, and consequently 
it follows that the hourly productivity of the disabled individuals also determines to what 
extent non-disabled individuals should be rewarded for hours worked. In order to implement 
such a compensation system, society has to introduce a marginal tax rate on the non-disabled 
individuals that makes their marginal post-tax income from work equal to the marginal 
productivity of the disabled individuals. The size of the unconditional disability compensation 
will then be the total revenue from this tax divided by the number of individuals in the 
economy.  
 
To illustrate, consider an economy where half the population work four hours and half the 
population work eight hours and where a quarter of the population is disabled. Let us assume 
that the non-disabled individuals have a productivity of 40 USD per hour and that the disabled 
individuals have a productivity of 20 USD per hour. The pre-tax income of a disabled 
individual is therefore only half the pre-tax income of a non-disabled individual who works 
the same number of hours. Suppose that the disabled individuals are given an unconditional 
compensation for their disability. It follows straightforwardly that the post-tax income 
difference between the disabled individual working eight hours and the disabled individual 
working four hours will be 80 USD, which is identical to the difference in their pre-tax 
income. If we now turn to two non-disabled individuals working four hours and eight hours, 
respectively, then it follows immediately from the principle of equalization that they should 
receive the same post-tax income as the disabled individuals working the same number of 
hours. In other words, the post-tax income difference between these two non-disabled 
individuals should also be 80 USD. This implies that we have to impose a marginal tax of 
                                                 
6 The formal proof of this result and the other results in this paper are available on request. 
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50% on the non-disabled individuals, which again implies that their hourly post-tax wage will 
be 20 USD per hour. Finally, in order to satisfy the principle of equalization the non-disabled 
individuals and the disabled individuals must get the same unconditional transfer, which 
implies that the unconditional disability compensation is equal to 90 USD.7 
 
Even if there exists a system of unconditional disability compensation that satisfies the 
principle of equalization, there does not exist any such system that also satisfies the principle 
of responsibility.  
 
Corollary 1: There is no unconditional compensation system that satisfies both principle of 
equalization and the principle of responsibility. 
 
This result follows from the fact that the unique system of unconditional disability 
compensation that satisfies the principle of equalization involves a net transfer from those 
who work many hours to those who work few hours even when these responsibility-groups 
are representative. In other words, this system violates the principle of responsibility. 
 
To illustrate, consider again the example where people either work eight hours or work four 
hours, and keep in mind that we assume that distribution of hours worked is the same among 
the non-disabled individuals and the disabled individuals. The principle of responsibility 
implies that there should be no redistribution between the two representative responsibility-
groups, which is to say that the total post-tax income of those working four hours should be 
equal to their total pre-tax income. But this is not the case with the unique unconditional 
compensation system that satisfies the principle of equalization. With this compensation 
system there is, on average, a net transfer of 30 USD from those who work eight hours to 
those who work four hours.8   
 
3.2. Conditional disability compensation 
 
                                                 
7 On average the able individuals work six hours and they thus pay an average tax of 120 USD. The disabled 
individuals do not pay any tax. The uniform compensation is thus 90 USD, since three quarter of the population 
is assumed to be able.  
8 The average hourly wage in the economy is 35 USD and the average pre-tax income of those who work eight 
hours is therefore 280 USD. Their post-tax income, however, is 250 USD (160 USD plus the uniform transfer of 
90 USD). The average net transfer is equal to the difference between the average pre-tax income and the average 
post-tax income. 
 11
A system of conditional disability compensation differentiates the compensation given to the 
disabled individuals based on their choices. Such a system might, for example, give a larger 
compensation to disabled individuals who work many hours than to disabled individuals who 
work few hours. 
 
It turns out that there is a unique system of conditional disability compensation that satisfies 
our two principles. 
 
Result 2: If all individuals are responsible for their choice of hours worked, but not for their 
productivity, then the only system of disability compensation that satisfies the principle of 
equalization and the principle of responsibility is one where (a) disability compensation is 
conditional and increasing in hours worked, and (b) disability compensation and the 
financing of it ensures that the post-tax hourly wage is the same for the non-disabled 
individuals and the disabled individuals and equal to the average hourly pre-tax wage in the 
economy. 
 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Since we have assumed that the share of 
disabled individuals is the same at all effort levels, all responsibility-groups are 
representative.9 In such a situation the principle of responsibility implies that the total post-tax 
income received by all individuals in a responsibility-group should equal the total pre-tax 
income of that group. Since the average productivity is constant for all individuals, the 
principle of equalization then implies that all individuals should earn the average hourly pre-
tax wage rate in the economy. This implies that the disability compensation is conditional and 
increasing in the number of hours worked.  
 
To illustrate, consider again our example where the non-disabled individuals have a 
productivity of 40 USD per hour and the disabled individuals have a productivity of 20 USD 
per hour and assume that three quarter of the population is non-disabled. The average hourly 
pre-tax wage is then 35 USD, and the two principles in combination thus imply that an 
additional working hour should be rewarded with 35 USD for all individuals. By rewarding an 
                                                 
9 Further specification is needed on how to compensate in cases where not all responsibility-groups are 
representative. This problem has been discussed extensively in a more general context in the social choice 
literature (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) and Fleurbaey (2007) for overviews), where one proposal 
consistent both with the principle of equalization and the principle of responsibility is the generalized 
proportionality principle (Cappelen and Tungodden, 2007).  
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additional working hour with the average marginal productivity, the compensation of the 
disabled individuals becomes conditional on the choice of working hours. The disabled 
individuals receive a compensation of 15 USD per working hour, which implies that disabled 
individuals working four hours receive a compensation of 60 USD, whereas disabled 
individuals working eight hours receive a compensation of 120 USD. These transfers are 
financed by a 12.5 percent tax on the hourly pre-tax wage of the non-disabled individuals. The 
tax on the non-disabled individuals implies that they also earn 35 USD per hour after taxes. 
The system thus satisfies the principle of equalization. The principle of responsibility is also 
satisfied, because the total post-tax income is equal to the total pre-tax income for each 
responsibility-group. 
  
In sum, the principle of equalization and the principle of responsibility have important 
implications for both the structure and the level of a fair system of disability compensation. 
There is a unique compensation system that satisfies both principles, and this system makes 
the compensation conditional on, and increasing proportionally in, how many hours the 
disabled individual chooses to work. Moreover, the two principles imply that the 
compensation per hour is set so as to ensure that the average post-tax income of the disabled 
individuals is equal to the average post-tax income of the non-disabled individuals.   
 
4. Non-responsibility and disability compensation 
 
So far we have assumed that disabled individuals should be held responsible for their choice 
of working hours. Some disabilities, however, might have as an effect that we do not want to 
hold the disabled individual responsible for his choices. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, some disabilities might result in individuals not being competent to make some 
decision. Second, work-place bias might deny some disabled individuals employment 
opportunity and relegated them to part-time or marginal jobs. In this section we study how 
fair disability compensation should be designed when the disabled individuals are not held 
responsible for the same choices as non-disabled individuals. 
 
4.1. Non-responsibility and equal productivity 
In order to address this question, it is instructive to start by making the assumption that the 
non-disabled individuals and the disabled individuals are equally productive and that the only 
difference between the two groups is that the disabled individuals are not responsible for his 
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choice of work effort. Hence, we hold the non-disabled individuals responsible for their 
choice of working hours, but not the disabled individuals. We still assume that the distribution 
of hours worked is the same among the non-disabled individuals and the disabled individuals.  
 
Also in this case the principle of equalization and the principle of responsibility characterize a 
unique system of disability compensation. 
 
Result 3: If non-disabled individuals, but not disabled individuals, are responsible for their 
choice of hours worked, and all individuals are equally productive, then the only 
compensation system that satisfies the principle of equalization and the principle of 
responsibility is one where (a) disability compensation is conditional and decreasing in hours 
worked, (b) disability compensation ensures that the post-tax income of all the disabled 
individuals is equal to the average income in the economy, and (c) disability compensation 
only involves transfers among the disabled individuals.  
 
To see this, note that since the disabled individuals are not responsible for their choice of 
hours worked, all disabled individuals are in the same responsibility-group, independent of 
how many hours they work. Non-disabled individuals who work different numbers of hours 
are in different responsibility-groups, however. All responsibility-groups are furthermore 
representative because we have assumed that the productivity is the same for all individuals. 
Since all responsibility-groups are representative, there should be no redistribution between 
the non-disabled individuals and the disabled individuals or between non-disabled individuals 
who choose to work different number of hours. Moreover, the principle of equalization 
implies that all disabled individuals should have the same post-tax income independent of 
how many hours they work. Hence, there should be complete equalization within the group of 
disabled individuals, and thus, given that they are as productive as the non-disabled 
individuals, it follows that all disabled individuals should receive the average income in the 
economy. The disability compensation given to each disabled individual is therefore equal to 
the difference between his actual pre-tax income and the average income in the economy. 
This implies that the compensation is conditional and decreasing proportionally in the number 
of hours worked.  
 
4.2. Non-responsibility and reduced productivity 
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The assumption that disabled individuals and non-disabled individuals are equally productive 
is not realistic in situations where the disabled individuals are not responsible for his work 
effort. It is reasonable to assume that an impairment that reduces an individuals control over 
his choices also reduces his productivity. It is likely that a person who is not responsible for 
his choice of working hours also is less productive than the average non-disabled individual. 
We therefore need to ask how we should compensate disabled individuals when their 
disability results both in a reduced ability to make autonomous choices and in a lower 
productivity.  
 
The principle of responsibility is unable to guide us in such situations, because the 
responsibility-group consisting of all the disabled individuals is not representative. However, 
it turns out that a reasonable strengthening of the principle of equalization provides the 
needed link between these situations and the situations analyzed in the previous section. One 
way to formulate the egalitarian intuition is to say that how we distribute income between 
individuals should be independent of the distribution of non-responsibility factors in society. 
The distribution of non-responsibility factors may affect the total income that is to be 
distributed, but the share of the total income each individual receive should only depend on 
the distribution of responsibility factors. We thus introduce the following stronger version of 
the principle of equalization: 
  
The strong principle of equalization: If all individuals have the same responsibility factors 
in two situations, then each individual’s share of the total income should be the same in the 
two situations.  
 
It follows straightforwardly that the strong principle of equalization implies the principle of 
equalization given the requirement of anonymity.10 More importantly, by combining the 
strong principle of equalization with the principle of responsibility, we can now formulate the 
following result. 
 
                                                 
10 To see this, consider any situation where two individuals are identical with respect to their responsibility 
factors, but differ with respect to their non-responsibility factors. Compare this to a situation where they are also 
equal with respect to non-responsibility factors, and everything else remains the same in society. Anonymity 
requires that they receive the same post-tax income (and share of the total income) in the latter situation. The 
strong principle of equalization requires that each individual’s share of the total income should be the same in 
the latter and the former situation. In sum, they also get the same share in the former situation, and the principle 
of equalization is satisfied. 
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Result 4: If non-disabled individuals, but not disabled individuals, are responsible for their 
choice of hours worked, and disabled individuals are less productive, then the only 
compensation system that satisfies the strong principle of equalization and the principle of 
responsibility is one where (a) disability compensation is conditional and decreasing in hours 
worked, (b) disability compensation ensures that the post-tax income of all the disabled 
individuals is equal to the average income in the economy, and (c) disability compensation is 
financed by taxing the income of the non-disabled individuals so that their hourly post-tax 
wage is equal to the average hourly pre-tax wage in the economy.  
 
To see this, note first that Result 3 also holds when replacing the principle of equalization 
with the strong principle of equalization. Result 3 implies that all disabled individuals should 
receive the average income in a situation where the disabled individuals have the same 
productivity as the non-disabled individuals. Consider now the new situation in which the 
disabled individuals are less productive than the non-disabled individuals, but where all 
individuals work the same number of hours as in the previous situation. The strong principle 
of equalization tells us that the share of total income each individual receives should be the 
same in the two situations, because there has been no change in responsibility factors. The 
disabled individuals should, in other words, still receive the average income, even though 
average income will be lower in the latter situation (since the productivity of the disabled 
individuals is lower). Hence, the disability compensation is conditional and decreasing in 
hours worked. The shares of the total income the non-disabled individuals receive should all 
be the same in the two situations, which is only possible if we impose a proportional tax on 
the non-disabled individuals such that their hourly post-tax wage is equal to the average 
hourly wage in the economy.  
 
Again we note that the principle of responsibility and, in this case, the strong principle of 
equalization have important implications for the structure and the level of a fair system of 
disability compensation. There is a unique disability compensation system that satisfies both 
principles and this system makes the compensation conditional on how many hours the 
disabled individual works. This may seem surprising, given that we consider a situation where 
we do not hold the disabled individual responsible for his choice of hours worked. But the 
point is that this lack of responsibility implies that all disabled individuals should receive the 
same post-tax income. Given that they work different hours, this implies that the fair 
disability compensation has to be decreasing in hours worked. Furthermore, interestingly, we 
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note by comparing Result 2 and Result 4, that the total level of transfers from the non-
disabled individuals to the disabled individuals is independent of whether we hold them 
responsible for hours worked or not. In both cases the disabled individuals get, on average, a 
post-tax income equal to the average income in society.  
 
4.3. A challenge 
 
A challenge to the system of disability compensation presented in Result 4 is that it violates 
another intuitively appealing moral principle. Consider the following requirement. 
 
The no discrimination principle: If two individuals are identical with respect to all factors 
determining their pre-tax income, then they should receive the same post-tax income. 
 
The non-discrimination principle implies that the fact that we do not hold the disabled 
individuals responsible for their choice of hours worked cannot in itself justify an inequality 
between the non-disabled individuals and the disabled individuals. Any fair inequality 
between individuals must be related to differences in factors determining their pre-tax income. 
In our framework, if two individuals are equally productive and work the same number of 
hours, then they should receive the same post-tax income. 
 
Interestingly, it is not possible to combine this principle with the strong principle of 
equalization and the principle of responsibility.   
 
Result 5: If non-disabled individuals, but not disabled individuals, are responsible for their 
choice of hours worked, then there is no compensation system that satisfies the strong 
principle of equalization, the principle of responsibility, and the no discrimination principle.   
 
This result follows straightforwardly from applying Result 3, which shows that, given the 
assumptions of the result, all disabled individuals should get the average income in the 
economy and all non-disabled individuals should get their pre-tax income. A non-disabled 
individual working less than the average number of hours receives under such a system less 
than the average income and, therefore, earns less than a disabled individual working the 
same number of hours. This violates the no discrimination principle.  
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The proof of this result appeals to a situation where non-disabled and disabled individuals are 
equally productive, but the same kind of conflict exists even if in situations where the 
disabled individuals have lower productivity. Suppose that we reformulated the no 
discrimination principle, such that it states that an individual should not receive a lower post-
tax income than another individual with lower productivity who works the same number of 
hours. It follows immediately from Result 4 that it is also impossible to combine this version 
of the principle with the strong principle of equalization and the principle of responsibility. 
We have already shown that in the case where both the non-disabled individual and the 
disabled individual work less than average hours and are equally productive, the non-disabled 
individual ends up with a lower post-tax income. But the strong principle of responsibility 
implies that this should hold even if the productivity of the disabled individuals is reduced, 
everything else being the same. Thus, the non-disabled individual will end up with a lower 
post-tax income than the disabled individual even though he works the same number of hours 
and is more productive.  
 
We believe that this conflict poses a dilemma in the design of liberal egalitarian policies that 
aim at incorporating both non-disabled individuals and disabled individuals in the same 
sphere of justice. However, one might argue that the no discrimination principle is too strong 
a requirement on a theory of justice. One might for example argue that individuals with 
intellectual impairments do not deserve to be rewarded in the same way as non-disabled 





The ambition of this paper has been to study how a fair system of disability compensation 
ideally should be designed under the assumption that the disabled individuals belong to the 
same sphere of justice as other members of society. In particular we have been concerned 
with how a society that aims to satisfy two basic liberal egalitarian principles should 
compensate (i) individuals with impairments that reduce their productivity and (ii) individuals 
with impairments that directly or indirectly affect the extent to which they are responsible for 
their choice of work effort.  
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The main results of in this paper are derived in a simplified framework in which all disabled 
are assumed to have the same productivity and to be responsible for the same set of factors. In 
the real word these assumptions clearly do not hold. Disabled individuals differ both with 
respect to how their impairments affect their productivity and with respect to how their 
impairments affect the extent to which they are responsible for their choice of work effort. It 
is therefore important to address the question of how our results extend to a more general 
framework where disabled individuals might differ along these two dimensions.  
 
The result that a system of disability compensation should be conditional on choices, Result 1, 
obviously does not depend on the assumption that there are only two productivity levels. The 
lesson from this result in the design of real world disability policies is that compensation only 
is justified if the impairment is a serious limitation in the pursuit of some goals, for example 
the goal of active participation in the labour market.  
 
The main lesson from result 2 is that the disability compensation should be set so that 
disabled individuals receive the labour income they would have received in the absence of 
their impairment. In a world where some disabled individuals have severely reduced 
productivity while other disabled individuals are as productive as the non-disabled this result 
implies that the compensation must depend on the severity of disability. More precisely, the 
disability compensation should ideally be set equal to the difference between the actual 
income of the disabled individual and the average income individuals who make the same 
work effort. 
 
We believe that these two results provide an important message in a debate on how to 
integrate disabled individuals in the labour market. If disabled individuals are to be treated as 
responsible and autonomous individuals then we must be willing to hold them responsible for 
their choices as well. There has, however, been considerable resistance against holding 
disabled individuals responsible for their choices. This resistance is similar to the resistance 
against holding individuals responsible for their choices in the context of health care 
(Cappelen and Norheim 2005). One reason for this resistance is that the call for individual 
responsibility often is associated with the position that individuals should face the actual 
consequences of their choices. In this paper we explain why it would be unfair to hold 
individuals responsible for the actual consequences of their choice of work effort when their 
productivity is reduced as a result of their impairment. More importantly, we show that it is 
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possible to hold disabled individuals responsible for their choice of work without at the same 
time holding them responsible for their impairments. 
 
Another result from this paper that does not depend on our simplifying assumptions is the 
result concerning how society should compensate those disabled individuals that are not 
responsible for their choice of work effort. We argue that those disabled individuals who, 
either because they lack control over their choices or because they do not have employment 
opportunities, are not responsible for their choice of work effort should receive the average 
labour income in society. This result has strong policy implications because it suggests a 
much higher level of compensation that what is common.  
 
The results in this paper describe what would constitute an ideal system of disability 
compensation. Implementing this system would require information that is not always 
available to the government. It is for example a well known problem from the literature on 
optimal tax policy that it is difficult to get reliable information about working time. We do 
believe, however, that ideal theory still is important as a standard against which one can 
measure actual policies. It is important to notice the difference between using information on 
effort, for example labour supply, in the operation of compensation systems and in the 
evaluation of such systems. Even if information about individual work effort can not be used 
directly by the tax authorities, there is a lot of statistical information available on labour 
supply that can easily be used in normative analysis of alternative compensation systems. 
 
Finally, we want to stress that this article has assumed that individual choices of work effort 
are independent of the compensation scheme. We have done this in order to focus on what 
constitute a fair system of disability compensation. A complete analysis of disability 
compensation must, of course, take into account possible incentive effects. Such an analysis 
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